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NOTE 
Dual Environmentalism:  
Demand Response Mechanisms in  
Wholesale and Retail Energy Markets 
 
SARAH M. MAIN* 
  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Electricity production is the collectively most carbon-intensive 
process on the planet.1 The predominant use of fossil fuels to meet 
growing electricity demand makes electric power generation a key 
contributor to global carbon emissions.2 In 2015, fossil fuel-
powered generators produced 67 percent of United States 
electricity demand and contributed to 37 percent of the country’s 
carbon emissions – more than any other economic sector.3 As the 
 
 * Sarah M. Main is a third-year J.D. and Environmental Law Certificate 
candidate at the Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University. She received 
a Bachelor of Arts, summa cum laude, in Environmental Studies and Political 
Science with honors from Saint Michael’s College in 2013. She is a member of Phi 
Beta Kappa, Delta Epsilon Sigma, and Pi Sigma Alpha national academic honor 
societies. She has focused her studies on renewable and alternative energy 
transitions, government policy, and international climate initiatives. The author 
would like to thank John Bowie for sparking her interest in the subject matter, 
Noah Shaw for prompting her to think about the subject matter in different 
contexts, and the Pace Environmental Law Review for entertaining her musings 
on the subject matter. 
1. Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, EPA, http://www3.epa.gov/ 
climatechange/ghgemissions/global.html [https://perma.cc/76XZ-7XZ5] (last 
updated Aug. 9, 2016). 
2. Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, EPA, http://www3.epa.gov/ 
climatechange/ghgemissions/sources/electricity.html [https://perma.cc/Z4RP-WT 
29] (last updated Oct. 6, 2016). 
3. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., What Is U.S. Electricity Generation by Energy 
Source?, EIA, https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=427&t=3 [https:// 
1
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primary driver of global climate change, atmospheric carbon 
dioxide is the most detrimental consequence of turning on the 
lights.4 In addition to the alarming amount of carbon dioxide 
emitted from this single, essential process, methane and nitrous 
oxide are also released, exacerbating the heat-trapping potential of 
the atmosphere.5 With the United States’ energy-related carbon 
dioxide emissions rising 1 percent each year, major electric power 
industry reforms are necessary to mitigate widespread, adverse, 
environmental impacts and avoid catastrophic climate change.6  
Carbon dioxide is emitted in electricity production when fossil 
fuel-fired generators burn coal, oil, and natural gas to release heat 
energy.7 Before the combustion of carbon-dense fossil fuels even 
occurs, the processes by which these resources are mined and 
extracted creates an additional, massive environmental impact.8 
 
perma.cc/WX94-FKU9] (last updated Apr. 1, 2016); U.S. Energy Info. Admin., 
How Much of U.S. Carbon Dioxide Emissions are Associated with Electricity 
Generation?, EIA, [https://perma.cc/KJD5-AY7X] (last updated Apr. 1, 2016). 
Agriculture, forestry, and other land uses came in close second for global carbon 
emissions, at 24%. Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, supra note 1. In 2014, 
the generation of electricity accounted for 25 percent of all global carbon 
emissions. Id. Data for 2013-2014 is based on the IPCC’s 2014 global emissions 
report, using emissions data from 2010. Id.; Understanding the IPCC Reports, 
WORLD RES. INST., http://www.wri.org/ipcc-infographics [https://perma.cc/3MVG-
P6L6]. 
4. Why Does CO2 Get Most of the Attention When There Are So Many Other 
Heat Trapping Gases (Greenhouse Gases)?, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, 
http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/science_and_impacts/science/CO2-and-
global-warming-faq.html#.VtzNTJMrKHo [https://perma.cc/R2C8-ZLB4]. 
5. Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, supra note 1. 
6. Understanding the IPCC Reports, supra note 3; SUSAN JOY HASSOL, 
PRESIDENTIAL CLIMATE ACTION PROJECT, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: EMISSIONS 
REDUCTIONS NEEDED TO STABILIZE CLIMATE (2007), https://www.climate 
communication.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/presidentialaction.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4LD7-4Y69]. 
7. CO2 Emissions Associated with Biomass Use at Stationary Sources, EPA, 
https://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/biogenicemissions.html 
[https://perma.cc/X5TX-U4MN] (last updated Sept. 26, 2016). Carbon dioxide is 
also emitted in the burning of biomass fuels, like biogas and wood; however, the 
carbon dioxide released from biomass is considered biogenic carbon. Id. Biogenic 
carbon dioxide is associated with the natural carbon cycle. Id. Forest-derived and 
agriculture-derived fuels sequester carbon from the atmosphere during 
photosynthesis. Id. When burned, these fuels release the carbon dioxide that, 
unlike coal, oil, and natural gas, was originally removed from the natural carbon 
cycle. Id. 
8. Nathalie Butt & Hawthorne Beyer, Leave It in the Ground! How Fossil 
Fuel Extraction Affects Biodiversity, CONVERSATION (Oct. 24, 2013, 3:44 PM), 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss1/4
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The extraction and combustion processes significantly contribute 
to global climate change long before the transmission, distribution, 
and often wasteful consumption of electricity takes place.  
Despite growth in the renewable energy sector, non-renewable 
fossil fuels are the primary fuel source in the United States and 
around the world.9 The type of fuel used in energy production – 
whether natural gas, coal, wind, or solar – can affect the carbon 
footprint of the entire grid operation.10 However, fuel source is only 
one factor in the environmental impact equation. Aging 
infrastructure throughout the United States has made the 
transmission and distribution of electricity less efficient and 
unreliable.11 Upgrading infrastructure and moving generation 
closer to the source of consumption requires hefty investments and 
is associated with its own slew of negative environmental 
impacts.12 Thus, a key approach to mitigating climate change 
 
http://theconversation.com/leave-it-in-the-ground-how-fossil-fuel-extraction-
affects-biodiversity-19484 [https://perma.cc/Y49X-5UMQ]. The extraction of fossil 
fuels is associated with potential environmental hazards, including habitat 
destruction and fragmentation which threaten biodiversity, the production of 
toxic wastes and heavy metals which pollute flora and fauna habitats and 
contaminate groundwater, noise and air pollution which affect human and animal 
species alike, land subsidence, alterations in the water table, and facilitation of 
invasive species and pathogens, among other direct and indirect environmental 
harms. Id. 
9. Energy and Global Warming, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, 
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/climate_law_institute/energy_and_g
lobal_warming/ [https://perma.cc/R79F-UAM9]; see WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL, 
WORLD ENERGY RESOURCES: 2013 SURVEY 6 (2013), https://www.worldenergy.org/ 
wpcontent/uploads/2013/09/Complete_WER_2013_Survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
DR3T-E7RR]. 
10. See WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL, supra note 9, at 4. 
11. See ALISON SILVERSTEIN, TRANSMISSION 101: NCEP TRANSMISSION 
TECHNOLOGIES WORKSHOP 25-26 (2011), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/energy/ 
ASilverstein4-20-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/NGF6-8WHH]. 
12. See id. at 17-26. This note does not address technical advancements to 
electric grid infrastructure that could improve the efficiency of electricity 
transport and distribution. While a large amount of energy is lost in transmission 
and distribution (6% in 2014), this note focuses primarily on the role of demand 
response in mitigating the adverse environmental impacts of the electric power 
industry. U.S. Energy Info. Admin, How Much Energy is Lost in Transmission 
and Distribution in the United States?, EIA, https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/ 
faq.cfm?id=105&t=3 [https://perma.cc/SM5G-W6RJ] (last updated Apr. 6, 2016). 
As of the writing of this note, the United States is actively studying ways to 
modernize the electric grid. The Department of Energy anticipates that “in the 
next two decades, large transmission and distribution investments will be made 
3
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effects, and internalizing the environmental externalities 
associated with electricity production and consumption, is to alter 
the way end-use customers consume electricity.13  
Reducing consumption can shape market preferences for fuel 
sources, promoting renewable and cleaner-burning fuels over 
costly fossil fuel resources.14 Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Electric Power Supply 
Association, wholesale energy market conditions did not give retail 
customers a clear incentive to cut consumption.15 To incentivize 
energy conservation in the interim, state and federal entities 
implemented programs to motivate change in electricity 
consumption.16 Demand response is one such mechanism.  
 
to replace aging infrastructure; maintain reliability; enable market efficiencies; 
and aid in meeting policy objectives, such as greenhouse gas reduction and state 
renewable energy goals.” U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, QUADRENNIAL ENERGY REPORT: 
ENERGY TRANSMISSION, STORAGE, AND DISTRIBUTION INFRASTRUCTURE (2015), 
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/04/f22/QER-ALL%20FINAL_0.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/92YA-8764]. 
13.  See David Nemtzow et al., The Green Effect, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 2007, 
at 42, https://www.scc.virginia.gov/pue/conserve/c_2/cn_consdem_0307.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BG46-VALW]. 
14.  See generally id. at 42 (discussing studies that reveal customer responses 
to feedback on electricity consumption); TOM OVERBYE ET AL., POWER SYSTEMS 
ENGINEERING RESEARCH CENTER, THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE: POWER SYSTEMS RESEARCH POSSIBILITIES 33-35 (2007), 
http://pserc.wisc.edu/documents/. . ./2007. . ./M-19_Final-Report_June-2007.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C38Y-SCG5]. While the cost of oil per kilowatt hour may be 
lower for the end-use customer than a kilowatt of wind- powered electricity, 
“costly” here considers the externality costs of both renewable and non-renewable 
resources, making non-renewables costlier than renewable alternatives. See Dana 
Nuccitelli, Fossil Fuels are Way More Expensive Than You Think, GUARDIAN (Mar. 
15, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus 
-97-per-cent/2015/mar/18/fossil-fuels-are-way-more-expensive-than-you-think 
[https://perma.cc/G7GC-YQ7B]. 
15.  FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016); STEVEN D. 
BRAITHWAIT ET AL., THE ROLE OF DEMAND RESPONSE IN ELECTRIC POWER MARKET 
DESIGN 5 (2002) [https://perma.cc/9FPG-TNWZ]. 
16.  For a state-level programs, see New York’s retail demand response 
initiatives. William Opalka, Demand Response for All Coming to New York, RTO 
INSIDER (June 22, 2015), http://www.rtoinsider.com/new-york-demand-response-
15883 [https://perma.cc/5UY7-4LCM]. For a federal assessment of demand 
response programs, see FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND 
RESPONSE AND ADVANCED METERING 5 (2014), https://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-
reports/2014/demand-response.pdf [https://perma.cc/6N2D-Q2ZR]. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss1/4
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Demand response programs exist in both wholesale and retail 
energy markets.17 Demand response may take the form of financial 
incentives to lower electricity consumption during peak demand 
periods, or permission for retail customers to bid reductions in use 
into the wholesale market at specified prices.18 Because demand 
response has numerous environmental and economic benefits,19 its 
potential to shape environmentally-conscious energy regulation is 
promising. Despite the clear potential of demand response in 
mitigating climate change and environmental degradation, the 
direct impact of demand response on the environment has been 
largely unexplored.20 Both wholesale and retail demand response 
programs aim to shape the consumption behaviors of end-use 
customers, and thus, the environmental benefits associated with 
demand response are specific to the location of the consumer.21 For 
these reasons, states and local entities may be better suited to 
design environmentally conscious demand response programs 
than a federal oversight agency. Nevertheless, federal regulation 
is needed to obtain environmental benefits, even locally.   
In the 2016 case of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(“FERC”) v. Electric Power Supply Association (“EPSA”), the 
Supreme Court was faced with determining FERC’s authority over 
demand response markets.22 FERC is an independent government 
agency created within the Department of Energy to ensure the 
protection of energy consumers and the public by monitoring the 
 
17. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Demand Response, ENERGY.GOV, http://energy.gov/ 
oe/technology-development/smart-grid/demand-response [https://perma.cc/8PDE-
C3LX]. 
18. BRAITHWAIT ET AL., supra note 15, at 3. 
19. Id. at 5. To name a few environmental benefits associated with demand 
response, reduced consumption during peak hours can diminish the need to 
dispatch polluting gas generators, thereby reducing carbon emissions; alleviate 
constraints in generation and transmission that result in energy lost in the form 
of heat, making the grid more efficient and reliable, which is associated with 
numerous environmental benefits; decrease overall demand for electricity, 
negating pressure to build costly, polluting, fossil-fueled power plants. Id. 
20. See Nemtzow et al., supra note 13, at 41. 
21. See id. 
22. See FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016); Robert 
Walton, Updated: Supreme Court Hears Arguments Over FERC Demand 
Response Rule, UTILITY DIVE (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/ 
updated-supreme-court-hears-arguments-over-ferc-demand-responserule/407293 
[https://perma.cc/LT6M-9MFA]. 
5
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legality of regulated energy companies.23 The issue raised 
questions about the division of power between the state and federal 
government over electricity markets.24 The Court ultimately ruled 
that FERC was within its jurisdiction when it used its rulemaking 
authority to allow retail demand response providers to sell into the 
wholesale market.25 FERC was also acting within its jurisdiction 
by requiring that retail providers be paid for demand response at 
the same price as wholesale generators.26 Despite initial concerns 
over separation of powers, the Supreme Court’s ruling provides 
room for states to play an integral part in the development and 
deployment of an environmental regulatory scheme. FERC v. 
EPSA and combined challenges set important precedent for the 
future of demand response and the permissible degree of federal 
oversight.27  
This note argues that a dual jurisdictional approach to 
demand response programming is better suited to mitigate 
environmental harms than an “either-or” regulatory model.28 
Through an exploration of FERC’s authority over wholesale 
demand response, state authority over retail-level demand 
response, and implications for electricity and capacity markets 
arising out of the Court’s decision in FERC v. EPSA, this note will 
offer effective legal mechanisms for mitigating environmental 
costs, while fostering environmental benefits. The next section of 
this note analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of state and 
federal regulatory approaches to demand response in isolation. 
 
23. What Is FERC?, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, http://www.ferc.gov/ 
students/whatisferc.asp [https://perma.cc/MFS9-X2DE]. FERC’s responsibilities 
include “regulating the interstate transmission of natural gas, oil, and electricity; 
regulating the wholesale sale of electricity (individual states regulate retail 
sales); . . .monitoring and investigating energy markets” and other wholesale 
market oversight, the siting of applications for electric transmission, and 
ensuring the reliability of the electric grid. Id. 
24. Walton, supra note 22. 
25. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 784. 
26. Id. 
27. See id. FERC v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n, No. 14-840 (U.S. Jan. 25, 
2016) was combined with EnerNoc, Inc. v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n, No. 14-
841 (U.S. Jan. 25, 2016) (together commonly referred to as EPSA II) upon a 
granting of certiorari. 
28. That is, as EPSA argued in support of, a state or federal approach with 
clear distinctions between the bounds of state jurisdiction in retail markets and 
FERC jurisdiction over wholesale markets. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss1/4
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Based on this assessment, this note suggests the policy 
mechanisms most conducive to environmentally-conscious electric 
energy regulation. This note concludes with a model regulatory 
scheme that utilizes demand response to mitigate global climate 
change and advance environmental sustainability. 
II. BACKGROUND ON WHOLESALE AND RETAIL 
ENERGY AND CAPACITY MARKETS  
An introduction to wholesale and retail market structures is 
necessary to understand the jurisdictional implications arising out 
of FERC v. EPSA. In each market, numerous players are involved 
in the procurement, management, regulation, and sale of 
electricity. These players have varying degrees of authority, each 
occupying a niche role in the market. The division of power 
between these wholesale and retail entities, and the extent to 
which they can be regulated by oversight agencies, should be 
considered in incorporating demand response into an 
environmental regulatory scheme. “Enlightened regulators will 
escape from zero-sum, ‘federal vs. state’ mindsets, instead focusing 
on which regulatory actors are best positioned to make which 
decisions.”29  
The electricity market is made up of wholesale and retail 
market components.30 The wholesale market comprises the 
supply-side of the electricity market, beginning with the 
conversion of fuel to energy and energy to electricity, and the 
subsequent distribution of that electricity from power providers to 
electric utilities.31 Wholesale power exists at the high-voltage 
points in the electric system, before the electricity flowing through 
transmission wires is stepped down to lower voltages for 
 
29. Scott Hempling, The Supreme Court Saves Demand Response: Now 
What?, SCOTT HEMPLING LAW (Feb. 2016), http://www.scotthemplinglaw.com/ 
essays/the-supreme-court-saves-demand-response [https://perma.cc/9TWU-B2 
6Z]. 
30. FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, ENERGY PRIMER: A HANDBOOK OF ENERGY 
MARKET BASICS 35 (2015), http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/guide/energy-
primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AKM-EA9R]. 
31. N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Understanding the Markets, NYISO, 
http://www.nyiso.com/public/about_nyiso/understanding_the_markets/wholesale
_retail/index.jsp [https://perma.cc/U8RD-72Z2]. 
7
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consumption.32 Wholesale power begins at the generator – 
typically a coal or natural gas-fired power plant – where fossil fuel 
combustion produces steam that is converted into electricity.33 The 
electricity is then powered up to high voltages to send over long-
distance transmission lines.34 The electricity enters the retail 
market when transformers step it down to low voltages for 
consumption.35  
The wholesale electricity market involves the sale of electricity 
amongst generators and owners of transmission, as well as electric 
utilities and traders.36 FERC has jurisdiction over wholesale 
energy markets, which cross state lines and sell electricity in 
interstate commerce.37 The wholesale market is divided into three 
regions of multi-state interconnections – the Western 
Interconnection, Eastern Interconnection, and Electric Reliability 
Council of Texas Interconnection.38 Within these interconnections, 
Regional Transmission Operators (“RTOs”) and Independent 
System Operators (“ISOs”) manage transmission and engage in the 
interstate sale of electricity on a regional basis.39 Each of these 
wholesale market operators administers a portion of the country’s 
electric grid and provides generators access to transmission 
infrastructure.40 FERC dictates the wholesale prices for electricity, 
and may choose to base that determination on either the market 
price of energy, or the costs of generation and transmission.41 
The retail market comprises the demand side of the electric 
system, or the sale of electricity to customers.42 Retail power 
companies, such as electric utilities and energy service providers, 
purchase power through their ISO’s or RTO’s regional wholesale 
 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. What is FERC?, supra note 23, at 35. 
37. Electricity Primer- The Basics of Power and Competitive Markets, ELEC. 
POWER SUPPLY ASS’N, https://www.epsa.org/industry/primer/?fa=wholesaleMar 
ket [https://perma.cc/CYL9-RJ2Q]. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 768 (2016). 
41. See FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, supra note 30. 
42.  See id. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss1/4
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market.43 This power is generated and transmitted in the 
wholesale market.44 When the power reaches transformers at the 
customer end of the electric grid, it is stepped down to low 
voltage.45 After being distributed to local power lines across a 
series of switchboards, the electricity reaches the end-use 
customer, who pays the retail price for their consumption.46  
 In the retail market, electric utility companies and energy 
service companies (“ESCOs”) sell power to individuals, businesses, 
and other end-use customers.47 Utilities are subject to the 
jurisdiction of the state public service commission or public utility 
commission, and are typically granted an exclusive service 
territory in exchange for providing services to customers.48 
Distribution utilities or electric utilities with this service obligation 
are called Load Serving Entities (“LSEs”), due to their role in 
supplying load, or electricity, to customers.49  
Various categories of customers exist within a service 
territory, such as commercial, residential, and industrial 
customers.50 The customer’s electric rate is based on the category 
in which the customer falls.51 The utility has a number of rate 
 
43.  N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, supra note 31. 
44.  Id. 
45.  Id. 
46.  Id. 
47.  Colin Fitzsimmons, What is the Role of the Utility vs. Retail Energy 
Provider?, DIRECT ENERGY BUS. (May 18, 2015), https://www.business. 
directenergy.com/blog/2015/may/what-is-the-role-of-the-utility-versus-a-retail-
energy-provider [https://perma.cc/S8ZZ-NF5F]. ESCOs are commercial or non-
profit businesses that provide a range of energy solutions, including the 
development, design, construction, and funding of projects that save energy, 
reduce energy costs, and reduce operational and maintenance costs for customer 
facilities. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Energy Service Companies, ENERGY.GOV, 
http://energy.gov/eere/femp/energy-service-companies-0 [https://perma.cc/U5AN-
K7Z7]. Unlike other entities that offer energy efficiency improvements, such as 
retrofits and risk management, ESCOs use performance-based contracting 
methodology to implement its projects, thereby directly linking a company’s 
compensation to actual energy cost savings. Id. 
48. In New York for example, electric utilities are given a mostly exclusive 
service territory in exchange for providing “just and reasonable” rates to 
customers. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 16, § 61.2 (2016). 
49. Federal Power Act § 217, 16 U.S.C. § 824q(a)(2)-(3) (2012). 
50. Fitzsimmons, supra note 47. 
51. Joshua M. Pearce & Paul J. Harris, Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
by Inducing Energy Conservation and Distributed Generation from Elimination 
of Electric Utility Customer Charges, 35 ENERGY POL’Y 6514, 6514-15 (2007). 
9
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schedules, known as tariffs, that dictate the price of electricity for 
the particular type of customer.52 These tariffs reflect the 
customer’s demand, while allowing the utility to make a 
reasonable return on investment.53  
 While wholesale and retail energy markets engage in the 
procurement, pricing, and sale of electricity as a fungible 
commodity, capacity markets engage future investments for 
energy demand.54 Capacity is “the capability of generation or other 
resources to meet demand; the ability to produce energy, not the 
energy itself.”55 Capacity is vital to the reliability of the electric 
grid and the ability of LSEs to meet future projected demand.56 
Every LSE on the grid must balance energy resources with load, or 
demand, at all times to avoid an imbalance in the flow of electrons 
throughout the grid.57 Such destabilization could result in power 
outages for customers in the region, even those customers who 
receive energy from a different LSE.58 Capacity ensures that the 
electric utility or supplier has adequate resources to meet customer 
demand plus a reserve amount to account for contingencies in the 
grid.59 Suppliers can meet their capacity requirements with 
 
52. BRAITHWAIT ET AL., supra note 15, at 14. 
53. Pearce & Harris, supra note 51, at 6524. 
54. Capacity Market (RPM), PJM LEARNING CENTER, https://learn.pjm.com/ 
three-priorities/buying-and-selling-energy/capacity-markets.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/GV75-QC9Q]. 
55. Jay Morrison, Capacity Markets: A Path Back to Resource Adequacy, 37 
ENERGY L.J. 1, 4 n.5 (2016). 
56. Capacity Markets, DIRECT ENERGY BUS., https://business.directenergy. 
com/understanding-energy/managing-energy-costs/deregulation-and-energy-
pricing/capacity-markets [https://perma.cc/E9AQ-HRGV]. 
57. Morrison, supra note 55, at 3. 
58. Id. 
59. Capacity Markets, supra note 56. Contingencies in the grid cause demand 
to spike above historical levels, and can cause major losses in transmission or 
generation resources with little to no notice to the grid operator. Morrison, supra 
note 55, at 3-4. Contingencies include unplanned grid trips, or disconnects, of 
large generators or transmissions lines that cause imbalances in the electric grid. 
Id.; see, e.g., ERIC HIRST, PRICE-RESPONSIVE DEMAND AS RELIABILITY RESOURCES 4 
(2002), http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/Hirst_PRDReliability_04-02. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/AS8R-ZNA5]. Accordingly, the grid must have access to 9-
20% more capacity than the anticipated peak demand, as based on historical 
forecasts, to meet demand in the event of contingencies. Morrison, supra note 55 
at 3-4. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss1/4
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generation capacity they own, with capacity purchased from other 
providers, or with capacity obtained through market auctions.60 
 Power generators are compensated for capacity, or the power 
they will provide at some point in the future.61 RTOs and ISOs, 
who manage capacity markets in their respective regions, pay 
generators for their available capacity, independent of energy 
costs.62 RTO and ISO payments come from the sale of capacity to 
LSEs at auction.63 LSEs purchase the amount of capacity 
necessary to meet the customer loads they serve within their 
RTO/ISO region.64 In capacity auctions, “there is no functional 
difference between a megawatt of power from a power plant and a 
megawatt of reduced power from efficiency or demand response.”65 
In other words, both energy resources (such as wind turbines, coal-
fired power plants, and other energy generators) and efficiency 
resources (measures that reduce the amount of an energy resource 
needed to meet demand) bid capacity into the market at the cost of 
operation.66  
Wholesale market operators (i.e. ISOs and RTOs) offer 
demand response programs in both wholesale energy and capacity 
markets.67 Likewise, FERC may institute demand response 
policies applicable to all wholesale entities subject to its 
jurisdiction.68 Utilities and other LSEs may also implement 
demand response programs in retail markets, resulting in on-bill 
reductions in the price of electricity for their customers.69 Demand 
response programs function through ISO and RTO auctions.70 At 
auction, aggregators of electricity customers and large-load 
 
60.  Capacity Markets, supra note 56. 
61.  Adam Jones, Opinion, Explainer: How Capacity Markets Work, MIDWEST 
ENERGY NEWS (June 17, 2013), http://midwestenergynews.com/2013/06/17/expla 
iner-how-capacity-markets-work [https://perma.cc/MRG8-FZTJ]. 
62.  Capacity Markets, supra note 56. 
63.  Id. 
64.  Id. 
65.  Jones, supra note 61. 
66.  Id. 
67.  See BRAITHWAIT ET AL., supra note 15, at 28. 
68.  Id. at 42. 
69. See, e.g., Demand Response Program Options, PAC. GAS & ELEC. CO., 
http://www.pge.com/en/mybusiness/save/energymanagement/index.page?WT.mc
_id=Vanity_demandresponse [https://perma.cc/9XRG-PGGJ]. 
70. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 770 (2016). 
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individual users submit bids to decrease electricity consumption by 
a certain amount of MWs, at a set price, for a set period of time.71 
Wholesale market operators treat these demand response bids like 
supply offers from generators.72 Operators then rank all the bids 
received from the least to most expensive in what is referred to as 
a “bid stack.”73 Winning bids receive the wholesale market price 
for their contributions, which is equivalent to the Locational 
Marginal Price (“LMP”). In economic principles, the LMP 
represents the added cost of meeting another unit of demand, 
which is the price an efficient market would produce.74  
Bids for efficiency resources in the capacity market, like 
demand response, have the ability to lower the market clearing 
price and displace more costly generators.75 For instance, a 
generator bidding 100 megawatts (“MW”) of demand response into 
the capacity market at $150 per MW asserts that, for the future 
period of time covered by the auction, it will curtail 100 MW of 
demand rather than generating 100 MW to meet demand.76 If the 
100 MW of demand response, when added to the bid stack, is 
enough to meet regional demand, the market clearing price is set 
at $150 per MW, as no other resources would be needed to serve 
forecasted load. If a peaking coal-fired power plant had bid 100 MW 
into the market $160 per MW, the demand response bid would 
displace the coal generator. All resources that bid in under $150 
 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Market Equilibrium, ECONS. ONLINE, http://www.economicsonline.co.uk/ 
Competitive_markets/Market_equilibrium.html [https://perma.cc/5J7R-C58U]. 
Efficient markets tend towards equilibrium. In wholesale electricity markets, 
when supply is balanced with demand in equipoise, the market is thought to have 
achieved economic equilibrium. Market Equilibrium, supra note 74. The market 
designates the price point at which supply equals demand, which varies on a 
regional basis, depending on the locational need of LSEs. Id.; see EPSA, 136 S. Ct. 
at 768-69. 
75. Market Equilibrium, supra note 74. The clearing price is the price needed 
to “clear the market.” In other words, the price all resources who bid into the 
market receive for their capacity commitments. Id. The price is set by the most 
expensive generator needed to meet demand. Id. When efficiency is bid into the 
market, less energy is needed to meet peak demand, reducing the amount of 
energy needed from costlier peaking generators, like coal plants, that often come 
in at the top of the bid stack. Id. 
76.  Id. 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss1/4
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per MW clearing price would receive $150 per MW, even if, for 
example, a wind turbine bid into the market at $100 per MW.77  
Prior to FERC v. EPSA, the division between wholesale and 
retail markets, and state and federal jurisdiction, was not clear in 
application to the country’s interconnected electric grid. Market 
regulation invited challenges to the scope and breadth of state and 
federal jurisdiction, and raised complications in the realm of 
cooperative federalism.78 Post-FERC v. EPSA, implementing the 
Supreme Court’s holding in real time energy markets may be a 
more challenging task than wading through the Federal Power Act 
on paper. In fact, the Supreme Court’s decision did not exactly 
clear the jurisdictional confusion. Retail markets strongly 
influence wholesale markets, and FERC jurisdiction over 
wholesale markets affects the sale of energy at retail levels.79 To 
prevent circumscribing states’ rights, the Court left one imperative 
question unanswered: whether demand response providers—in 
states that even have demand response programs to begin with – 
may sell only to retail utilities or may also (or instead) sell into 
wholesale markets.80   
III. JUDICIAL PRECEDENT AND STATUTORY 
AUTHORITY  
In the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court held that 
the Commerce Clause bars states from regulating “certain 
interstate electricity transactions, including wholesale sales (i.e. 
sales for resale) across state lines.”81 The ruling created a 
jurisdictional gap, referred to as the “Attleboro gap,” that could 
only be filled with legislation.82 Congress responded by passing the 
Federal Power Act in 1935.83 The Federal Power Act (“FPA”) 
confers jurisdiction on FERC to regulate wholesale electricity 
 
77.  Id. For additional examples of how capacity auctions function generally, 
see image entitled “How a Capacity Auction Works.” Jones, supra note 61. 
78. See EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 770. 
79. See FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, supra note 30, at 35. 
80. Hempling, supra note 29. 
81. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 767 (quoting Pub. Util. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro 
Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89-90 (1927)). 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
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markets and reserves jurisdiction over all other electricity sales 
(i.e. retail sales) to states.84 Specifically, the FPA charged FERC’s 
predecessor agency with instituting “effective federal regulation of 
the expanding business of transmitting and selling electric power 
in interstate commerce.”85 Accordingly, FERC must oversee all 
prices associated with interstate transactions, as well as “all rules 
and regulations affecting or pertaining to such rates or charges,” 
which must be “just and reasonable.”86 If any rate, charge, rule or 
regulation “affecting such rate [or] charge” fails to meet that 
standard, FERC must determine what is “just and reasonable” and 
“impose the same by order.”87 
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 declares it the policy of the 
United States that “demand response be encouraged,” and 
mandates that unnecessary barriers to demand response 
participation in energy markets be eliminated.88 To comply with 
this requirement, FERC issued rules to facilitate participation of 
demand-response providers in wholesale markets.89 FERC Order 
888, for instance, required wholesale market operators to permit 
retail electricity aggregators to bid demand response commitments 
directly into the wholesale market.90 When FERC passed the final 
rule, no party sought judicial review of the rulemaking.91 
Under the 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act, 
Congress instructed FERC to develop a national plan for demand 
 
84. Brief for the Petitioner at 3-4, FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. 
Ct. 760 (2016) (No. 14-840). 
85. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 767 (quoting New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 6 (2002)). 
86. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2012)). 
87. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2012)). 
88. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 84, at 9; see EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 770 
(citing 16 U.S.C. § 2642 (2005)). 
89. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 84, at 11. 
90. Non-Discriminatory Open Access Transmission Tariff, 18 C.F.R. § 35.28 
(2016) (commonly known as FERC Order 888). See also FERC Transmission 
Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public 
Utilities Rule, 18 C.F.R. § 35 (2016) (commonly known as FERC Order 1000). Both 
FERC Orders 888 and 1000 govern aspects of transmission that may have a 
relevant impact on federal demand response programs. 
91. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 84, at 11. 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss1/4
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response.92 FERC responded with rulemaking Order No. 745.93 
The rule amends prior FERC regulations mandated under the FPA 
to regulate demand response.94 FERC invoked its authority to 
amend its regulations under the FPA provision that mandates 
FERC change “any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting 
such rate, change, or classification” that is “unjust, unreasonable, 
unduly discriminatory, or preferential.”95 The D.C. Circuit vacated 
Order No. 745 in its entirety on the grounds that FERC 
overstepped its jurisdiction into the realm of state control.96 The 
court also found the rule’s compensation scheme to be arbitrary 
and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).97 
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the D.C. Circuit 
Court to address a question left unanswered in its initial 
decision.98  
A. FERC Order 745  
In March 2011, FERC issued rulemaking Order 745, 
commonly referred to as the Demand Response Rule.99 The rule 
regulates demand response in organized wholesale energy markets 
by establishing the price paid for demand response.100 The rule 
 
92. Id. at 9. 
93. See Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy 
Markets, Order No. 745, 134 FERC ¶ 61,187 (March 15, 2011) [hereinafter FERC 
Order 745]. 
94. Id. For instance, FERC Order 719 required wholesale market operators 
to receive demand response bids from aggregators of electricity customers except 
where state retail authority barred participation in the market. FERC v. Elec. 
Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 771 (2016). 
95. 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2012); see Brief for Petitioner, supra note 84, at 14. 
96. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 763. 
97. Id. In finding FERC’s compensation scheme to be arbitrary and 
capricious, the D.C. Circuit arrived at an alternate holding that did not address 
the jurisdictional question. Recent Case, Electric Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC: 
D.C. Circuit Rules that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Lacks 
Jurisdiction over Rates for Nonconsumption of Energy, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1518, 
1524 (2015). 
98. David T. Doot et. al., What’s Next? Potential Impact of the Landmark 
Supreme Court Decision in FERC v. EPSA on Demand Response Across the 
Country, DAY PITNEY LLP (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.daypitney.com/insights/ 
publications/2016/02/09-whats-next-potential-impact-of-ferc [https://perma.cc/4Y 
UG-W8MK]. 
99. See FERC Order 745, supra note 93. 
100. Id. 
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applies to RTOs or ISOs who conduct competitive auctions to set 
the wholesale price of electricity.101 When an RTO or ISO has the 
option of engaging in demand response by balancing supply and 
demand, rather than dispatching additional generation, the rule 
requires that demand response providers receive the same 
compensation for conserving energy as generators would for 
producing energy.102  
The rule is premised on the notion that a bid to provide 
electricity provides the same value to the wholesale market as a 
bid to generate more electricity, because each cost-effectively 
balances supply and demand.103 To ensure demand response and 
supply bids provide the same value, the rule requires that demand 
response bids must meet two conditions: first, “a demand response 
bidder must have the capability to provide the service offered; it 
must, that is, actually be able to reduce electricity use and thereby 
obviate the operator’s need to secure additional power.”104 Second, 
“paying LMP for a demand response bid must be cost effective, as 
measured by. . . the net-benefits test.”105 In exercising its 
rulemaking authority, FERC reasoned that the FPA grants 
jurisdiction over such bids because they “directly affect wholesale 
rates.”106 Likewise, the rule’s approach for compensating 
customers for engaging in demand response “helps to ensure the 
competitiveness of the organized wholesale energy markets and 
remove[s] market barriers to the participation of demand response 
resources, thus ensuring just and reasonable rates” in accordance 
with statutory mandate.107  
 
101. Id. 
102. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 767 (2016). 
103. Id. at 771. 
104. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
105. See id. at 771 (internal quotation marks omitted); FERC Order 745, 
supra note 93 at 1. The net-benefits test “makes certain that accepting a lower-
priced demand response bid over a higher-priced supply bid will actually save 
LSEs (i.e., wholesale purchasers) money.” EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 771. 
106. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 772 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824d (2012)). 
107. FERC Order 745, supra note 93, at 1. 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss1/4
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IV. DEMAND RESPONSE PRECEDENT  
A. FERC v. EPSA  
The Electric Power Supply Association (“EPSA”) brought the 
initial challenge to Order 745 in 2013.108 Electricity generation 
organizations, demand response providers, grid operators, and 
large corporations joined EPSA’s action, arguing FERC did not 
have authority under the Federal Power Act (“FPA”) to “regulate 
the rules used by operators of wholesale electricity markets to pay 
for reductions in electricity consumption and to recoup those 
payments through adjustments to wholesale rates.”109 In its brief 
on appeal to the Supreme Court, the EPSA argued that “FERC has 
no more jurisdiction to regulate retail-level ‘demand response’ 
through payments to retail customers than it does to raise retail 
prices directly.”110 The challenge sparked debate over the extent to 
which federal and state regulators can or cannot allow demand—
that is, anything on the customer side of the electric meter—to 
participate in grid affairs.111  
The D.C. Circuit ruled that the FPA bars FERC from directly 
regulating any matter under state control, including the retail 
energy market.112 The three-judge panel reasoned that demand 
response, while not necessarily a retail sale, is part of the retail 
market, exclusively within the jurisdiction of the states.113 Given 
longstanding precedent in the realm of agency rulemaking, FERC 
argued on appeal that the D.C. Circuit misinterpreted the FPA, 
and misapplied basic principles of agency deference under 
Chevron.114 According to the Solicitor General, who filed the 
 
108.  Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
109.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 95, at I. 
110.  Walton, supra note 22. 
111.  Robert Walton, EPSA Urges Supreme Court Not to Reconsider FERC 
Order 745 Invalidation, UTILITY DIVE (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.utilitydive. 
com/news/epsa-urges-supreme-court-not-to-reconsider-ferc-order-745-
invalidation/377342 [https://perma.cc/SS49-3ALQ]. 
112. Katherine Tweed, Supreme Court Will Hear FERC Order 745 Demand 
Response Case, GREENTECH MEDIA, (May 4, 2015), http://www.greentechmedia. 
com/articles/read/supreme-court-will-hear-ferc-order-745-demand-response-case 
[https://perma.cc/6XCD-QH4Q]. 
113. Id. 
114. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 95; Jeff St. John, The Future of 
Demand Response: How a Legal Challenge Could Dramatically Change the 
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Supreme Court challenge on behalf of FERC, the Court of Appeals 
“departed from the interpretive approach to the FPA that the court 
has applied for a half-century;” that is, to give FERC flexibility in 
performing its mandate of ensuring just and reasonable wholesale 
electricity rates.115  
The issues on appeal to the Supreme Court were: (1) whether 
FERC has the authority to regulate the rules by which operators 
of wholesale-electricity markets pay for reductions in electricity 
consumption and recoup those payments through adjustments in 
wholesale rates;116 and (2) even if FERC has requisite statutory 
jurisdiction, did the agency adequately justify why “demand 
response providers and electricity producers should receive the 
same compensation?”117  
The Supreme Court answered both questions affirmatively, 
upholding FERC’s Order 745. Writing for the majority, Justice 
Kagan outlined three holdings: First, FERC has authority to 
require wholesale electric market operators to pay the same price 
to demand response providers for conserving energy as generators 
for producing it, so long as customers actually save money.118 
Under the FPA, FERC’s regulatory jurisdiction is confined to these 
 
Industry, GREENTECH MEDIA (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.greentechmedia.com/ 
articles/featured/ferc-order-745-the-supreme-court-and-the-future-of-demand-
response [https://perma.cc/9PRA-RKMM]; see also Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Res. 
Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (“If the statute is silent or ambiguous with 
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s 
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”). “A permissible 
construction is one that is not ‘arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to 
statute.’” David Kemp, Chevron Deference: Your Guide to Understanding Two of 
Today’s SCOTUS Decisions, JUSTIA L. BLOG (May 21, 2012), https:// 
lawblog.justia.com/2012/05/21/chevron-deference-your-guide-to-understanding-
two-of-todays-scotus-decisions [https://perma.cc/QY3A-4FDV]. If the agency’s 
construction is permissible, the agency’s interpretation is given deference (so 
called Chevron deference). Id. The Government’s alternative argument on appeal 
to the Supreme Court was that FERC’s interpretation of the Federal Power Act 
was entitled to deference under Chevron. See FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 
136 S. Ct. 760, 773 n.5 (2016). Because the Court found FERC had clear authority 
to act under the statute, it did not address the issue of Chevron deference. Id. at 
785. 
115.  St. John, supra note 114. 
116.  EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 767. The Supreme Court articulated the first issue 
as whether “the FPA permits FERC to regulate these demand response 
transactions at all, or does any such rule impinge States’ authority?” Id. 
117.  Id.; Hempling, supra note 29. 
118.  EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 760; see Hempling, supra note 29. 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss1/4
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practices, and thus, Order 745 falls squarely within FERC’s 
wholesale domain.119 Second, although wholesale market 
transactions affect retail rates, FERC’s regulatory plan did not 
invade states’ authority to regulate retail rates.120 Finally, FERC’s 
compensation scheme of paying demand response providers at the 
LMP also paid to generators was not arbitrary and capricious 
under the Administrative Procedure Act.121  
The issues required the Court to interpret the FPA in the 
context of the interconnected electricity grid. Justice Kagan noted 
the challenge at hand, “in point of fact, if not of law – the wholesale 
and retail markets in electricity are inextricably linked.”122 
Adopting a “common sense construction of the FPA’s language, 
limiting FERC’s ‘affecting’ jurisdiction to rules or practices that 
‘directly affect the [wholesale] rate’,” the Court reasoned that 
regulating wholesale demand response was wholly within FERC’s 
jurisdiction.123 Demand response “directly affects” wholesale rates 
because, if rewarded at the LMP, as opposed to some lower price, 
more demand response providers will submit bids capable of 
displacing generation, in turn lowering wholesale electricity 
prices.124 Additionally, increased market participation by demand 
response providers places “downward pressure” on bids from 
generators, thereby encouraging power plants to offer electricity at 
lower prices, lest they risk losing out at auction.125 This too lowers 
rates for wholesale power purchasers, linking compensation for 
demand response directly to wholesale market prices.126  
Accordingly, FERC’s regulation did not violate the FPA by 
overstepping into the realm of state jurisdiction, “just because it 
affects – even substantially – the quantity or terms of retail 
sales.”127 In fact, the Court has long held that FERC may regulate 
matters beyond the wholesale market so long as States’ retail rate-
 
119.  EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 760. 
120.  Id. 
121.  Id. 
122.  Id. at 766. 
123.  Id. at 774. 
124.  Id. at 774-75. 
125.  EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 774-75. 
126.  Id. 
127.  Id. at 776. 
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setting authority is not infringed.128 In regulating demand 
response, FERC did no more than address transactions occurring 
in the wholesale market:  
Wholesale market operators administer the entire program, 
receiving every energy demand response bid made. Those 
operators accept such bid at the mandated price when (and only 
when) the bid provides value to the wholesale energy market by 
balancing supply and demand more “cost effectively” – i.e. at a 
lower cost to wholesale purchasers – than a bid to generate power. 
The compensation paid for a successful bid [Locational Marginal 
Price] (LMP) is whatever the operator’s auction has determined is 
the marginal price of wholesale electricity at a particular location 
and time. And those footing the bill are the same wholesale 
purchasers that have benefited from the lower wholesale price 
demand response participation has produced. In sum, whatever 
the effects at the retail level, every aspect of the regulatory plan 
happens exclusively on the wholesale market and governs 
exclusively that market’s rules.129 
EPSA argued to the contrary, claiming FERC usurped state 
power because the rule “effectively, even though not nominally 
regulates retail prices.”130 Nevertheless, EPSA conceded that 
 
128.  See, e.g., Panhandle E. Pipeline Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Ind., 332 
U.S. 507, 516 (1947) (holding the same); see also Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. 
ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 365, 370-73 (1988) (holding an order regulating 
wholesale purchases was within FERC’s jurisdiction and preempted state action 
despite clearly affecting retail prices); Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thomburg, 
476 U.S. 953, 959-61 (1986) (holding the same). 
129.  EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 776. While acknowledging that FERC’s statutory 
authority extends to “some surprising places,” the Court rejected the implications 
laid out by the D.C. Circuit. Id. at 774. In attempting to analogize the impact of 
wholesale demand response on retail rates, the D.C. Circuit drew conclusions 
beyond the scope of FERC’s jurisdiction: “markets in all electricity’s inputs – steel, 
fuel, and labor most prominent among them – might affect generator’s supply of 
power. . .and for that matter, markets in just about everything – the whole 
economy, as it were – might influence LSE’s demand.” Id. The Supreme Court 
tersely stated otherwise: Congress never intended for the FPA to grant such 
expansive jurisdiction. While wholesale level demand response does influence 
LSE’s demand, FERC’s rules governing wholesale demand response programs, 
unlike the D.C. Circuit’s hypothetical, meet the FPA’s standard of “directly 
affecting wholesale electricity rates.” Id. at 784 (emphasis added). Any extension 
to steel, fuel, or labor markets is too attenuated to fall within the FPA’s 
jurisdictional sphere. Id. 
130.  Id. at 777. 
20https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss1/4
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FERC’s rule did not set actual rates.131 Rather, states can continue 
to make or approve retail rates, and in designing those rates, may 
insulate customers from price fluctuations in the market.132 The 
Court looked to the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of “rate” in 
reaching its holding. “Rate,” according to Black’s, is “an amount 
paid or charged for a good or service.”133 Accordingly, the act of 
setting retail rates is to “establish the amount of money a consumer 
will hand over in exchange for power.”134 FERC does not set retail 
electric rates simply by altering the incentive to purchase that 
product.135 The Court dispelled the ESPA’s argument by refusing 
to redefine “rate” as the price paid for electricity plus the 
opportunity cost of foregoing other alternatives.136 
As its third and final holding, the Court found FERC’s 
compensation scheme was not arbitrary or capricious under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Order 745 attempts to 
ensure “just and reasonable” wholesale rates, as per FERC’s FPA 
mandate, by requiring market operators to compensate demand 
response providers in order to bring about “meaningful demand-
side participation” in the wholesale market.137 Upon meeting two 
conditions, market operators must pay the LMP for any accepted 
demand response bid as they would for any successful supply bids. 
In other words, demand response providers would receive the same 
payment for conserving electricity as generators would for 
producing it.138 
The two-condition contingency ensures that FERC satisfies its 
statutory mandate in regulating practices that directly affect 
wholesale rates:  
First, a demand response bidder must have the “capability to 
provide the service” offered; it must, that is, actually be able to 
reduce electricity use and thereby obviate the operator’s need to 
secure additional power. Second, paying the LMP for a demand 
 
131.  Id. 
132.  Id. at 777. 
133.  Id. (quoting Rate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)). 
134.  EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 777. 
135.  Id. 
136.  Id. at 778. 
137.  Id. at 771. 
138.  Id. 
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response bid “must be cost effective,” as measured by the net-
benefits test. That test makes certain that accepting a lower-priced 
demand response big over a higher-priced supply bid will actually 
save LSEs (i.e. wholesale purchasers) money.139 
The EPSA challenged FERC’s compensation scheme on the 
grounds of misplaced economic theory, arguing that paying the 
LMP would overcompensate demand response providers.140 Under 
the EPSA’s view, the LMP includes a retail rate that reflects the 
costs a generator incurs and the benefits it obtains in the 
process.141 In reaching the LMP value, FERC found such 
considerations to be irrelevant: “paying LMP to all generators – 
although some would then walk away with more profit and some 
with less – ‘encourages more efficient supply and demand 
decisions’. . .and [there is] no economic reason to treat demand 
response providers differently.”142 FERC went to great lengths to 
explain why rewarding demand response providers at the LMP 
encourages competition and in turn, lowers wholesale prices.143  
Despite the EPSA’s urging, the Court declined to read the 
“FPA, against its clear terms, to halt a practice that so evidently 
enables [FERC] to fulfill its statutory duties of holding down prices 
and enabling market reliability in the wholesale energy 
market.”144 In reviewing FERC’s compensation scheme, the Court, 
under the APA’s standard, refused to substitute its judgment for 
FERC’s expertise.145 The scope of the arbitrary and capricious 
standard is narrow – the court must uphold an agency’s 
rulemaking if the agency has “examined the relevant 
considerations and articulated a satisfactory explanation for its 
action, including a rational connection between the facts found and 
the choice made.”146 The Court affords great deference to FERC’s 
rate decisions upon a detailed explanation of its choice of the LMP 
 
139.  Id. 
140.  EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 782. 
141.  Id. 
142.  Id. at 783 (citation omitted). 
143.  Id. at 783. 
144.  Id. at 780. 
145.  Id. at 782 
146.  EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 782 (citation omitted). 
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pricing scheme over the opponent’s preferred LMP – G scheme.147 
Ultimately, FERC engaged in reasoned decision making, weighed 
competing views, and intelligibly explained its compensation 
decision, well within the bounds of its agency expertise.148   
B. Post FERC v. EPSA 
The Supreme Court’s decision makes clear that states may 
take some ownership of retail-level demand response, and leaves 
states with at least three definitive options.149 First, states can 
decide whether customers may even sell demand response to begin 
with.150 This option is pertinent to states that do not currently 
have demand response programs.151 Second, states can decide 
what companies can sell into the wholesale market, if at all.152 
Third, states can decide whether demand response, once 
aggregated by permitted companies, will be used to reduce local 
utility load (retail demand response) or will be sold directly into 
the wholesale market (wholesale demand response).153 
Accordingly, states have enormous discretion to implement the 
Court’s holding – their degree of power ranges from excluding 
demand response programs from their state altogether to 
determining whether demand response will be used in the retail or 
wholesale energy market. The wholesale market will continue 
exploring alternative rules to manage demand-side resources.154 
Some ISOs have already prepared plans to allow demand response 
to continue in other demand-side markets.155 The balance between 
state and federal control in electricity markets arising out of the 
Court’s decision has lead energy regulatory experts to call FERC 
 
147.  Id. at 782. The “G” value represents the retail cost and benefits, or the 
opportunity costs of foregoing generation. Id. 
148.  Id. at 784. 
149.  Id. 
150.  Hempling, supra note 29. 
151.  Id. 
152.  Id. 
153.  Id. 
154.  Davide Savenije, ICYMI: What To Expect When Demand Response Goes 
Before the Supreme Court, UTILITY DIVE (May 6, 2015), http://www.utilitydive. 
com/news/icymi-what-to-expect-when-demand-response-goes-before-the-
supreme-court/394575/ [https://perma.cc/BX2J-8XQL]. 
155.  Id. 
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v. EPSA a landmark decision for the future of energy law and 
policy.156   
New York agencies’ challenge to the NYISO’s Buyer-Side 
Mitigation (“BSM”) rule provides a case study into the 
jurisdictional aftermath of EPSA and sheds light on the challenges 
states are already facing in implementing the Court’s ruling.157 
New York’s Reforming the Energy Vision (“REV”) proceeding and 
California’s Independent System Operator’s (“CAISO”) Distributed 
Energy Resource Provider (“DERP”) Program are two examples of 
state-level market reforms that take advantage of demand 
response. These kinds of state retail-level demand response 
mechanisms are likely to take center stage. CAISO’s DERP has so 
far been successful at achieving electricity cost savings, and New 
York’s REV proceeding aims to achieve similar savings with 
alternative market mechanisms.158 Regardless of how individual 
states implement the Supreme Court’s ruling, they will play an 
integral role in forthcoming demand response mechanisms, filling 
the gaps where FERC’s jurisdiction does not reach.  
C. Top-Down v. Bottom-Up Regulatory Approaches 
The California Independent System Operator’s (“CAISO”) 
Distributed Energy Resource Provider (“DERP”) Program may 
serve as a model for states aiming to expand retail-level demand 
response.159 The DERP is a top-down regulatory approach, in that 
it is designed and administered by the ISO, and applies to electric 
 
156.  Walton, supra note 22. 
157.  See generally Complaint, N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n et al. v. N.Y. 
Indep. Sys. Operator, 153 FERC ¶ 61,022 (June 25, 2016) (No. EL 16-92-000). 
“New York agencies” includes the New York State Public Service Commission, 
New York Power Authority, Long Island Power Authority, New York State 
Energy Research and Development Authority, and the City of New York. Id. 
Advanced Energy Management Alliance and the Natural Resources Defense 
Council joined the New York agencies, who collectively comprise the 
“complainants” in the BSM challenge. Id. 
158.  See CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATORS, ENERGY STORAGE AND AGGREGATED 
DISTRIBUTED ENERGY EDUCATION FORUM 43 (2015), http://www.caiso.com/ 
Documents/Presentation-EnergyStorageandAggregatedDistributedEnergy 
Resource-EducationalForum.pdf [https://perma.cc/NN7S-QMXF4]. 
159.  See CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATORS, EXPANDED METERING AND TELEMETRY 
OPTION PHASE 2 (2015), http://www.caiso.com/Documents/DraftFinalProposal_ 
ExpandedMetering_TelemetryOptionsPhase2_DistributedEnergyResourceProvi
der.pdf [https://perma.cc/C386-DL6S]. 
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utilities.160 Under the rule, electric service companies and utilities 
can purchase and consolidate energy outputs from distributed 
energy resources into a bundle of resources that can then be sold 
into the ISO electricity market.161 Distributed Energy Resource 
Providers are analogous to demand response providers in current 
ISO markets, and thus, the CAISO reasoned that demand response 
is a category of distributed energy resources that may be 
aggregated and sold into the wholesale market.162 Essentially, the 
ISO did with the DERP what the Supreme Court allowed FERC to 
do under Order 745. With the DERP, utilities may sell demand 
response from the retail-level distributed energy resources into the 
wholesale market.163 FERC Order 745 allows aggregated retail 
customers, especially those owning or utilizing distributed energy 
resources, to sell demand response into the wholesale market.164  
 New York’s Reforming the Energy Vision (“REV”) 
proceeding, on the other hand, constitutes “bottom-up” reform.165 
The Public Service Commission (“PSC”) initiated REV, which 
works up from the PSC to the ISO level.166 REV aims to expand 
and integrate distributed energy resources into the state’s energy 
profile.167 While both the CAISO proposal and REV have the 
integration of distributed energy resources in mind, REV seeks to 
move distributed energy resources from alternative resources to 
the source of core generation in investor-owned utility business 
models.168 REV also differs in that participating distributed energy 
resource providers may sell distributed energy resource outputs 
 
160. Id. at 5. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 4. 
163. Id. at 5. 
164. FERC Order 745, supra note 93, at 1. 
165. Reforming the Energy Vision, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., 
http://www3.dps.ny.gov/W/PSCWeb.nsf/All/CC4F2EFA3A23551585257DEA007
DCFE2? [https://perma.cc/C2YX-TDEL]. The REV proceeding is “bottom-up” in 
that utilities, the entities closest to retail consumers, administer demand 
response. This is contrasted with California’s DERP “top-down” proceeding 
whereby ISOs, the regional entities closest to FERC (and thus farthest from retail 
customers) administers demand response. Under various tenants of New York’s 
REV initiative, demand response has been implemented in both the wholesale 
and retail markets. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. 
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into the retail market, as opposed to the ISO market proposed by 
the CAISO.169 
The CAISO’s DERP and New York’s REV proceeding are 
expected to act as models for ISOs, utilities, and state regulatory 
agencies to adopt market mechanisms for implementing demand 
response from retail customers into the wholesale market.170 
States can use these model programs as case studies for designing 
regulatory market mechanisms that take full advantage of demand 
response’s potential environmental benefits. While both the DERP 
and REV have environmental goals in mind, numerous other 
regulatory mechanisms exist to address climate change and 
mitigate environmental damages through the utilization of 
demand response. 
D.  Case Study: New York Buyer-Side Mitigation Rule 
Challenge 
In March 2008, FERC directed the NYISO to implement 
buyer-side mitigation (“BSM”) measures in its installed capacity 
market (“ICAP market”).171 Price signals in the ICAP market 
“indicate[ ] when sufficient capacity is available or when additional 
ICAP resources are needed to meet New York’s peak demand and 
maintain its planning reserve margin.”172 To prevent artificial 
suppression of capacity market prices, the NYISO instituted two 
capacity market mitigation measures: first, Offer Cap mitigation 
in the form of a maximum offer price intended to prevent suppliers 
from raising prices above competitive levels, and second, Offer 
Floor mitigation in the form of a minimum offer price aimed at 
preventing the suppression of prices below competitive levels.173 
The NYISO instituted the mandatory measures in the form of tariff 
provisions that limited the participation of certain demand 
 
169. Id. 
170. See Proceeding on Motion of the Commission in Regard to Reforming 
the Energy Vision, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF PUB. SERV., http://documents.dps.ny.gov/ 
public/MatterManagement/CaseMaster.aspx?MatterCaseNo=14-m-0101 
[https://perma.cc/4XJ3-247J]. 
171. N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 122 FERC ¶ 61,211, 62,191 (Mar. 7, 
2008). 
172. Complaint at 9-10, N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n et al. v. N.Y. Indep. 
Sys. Operator, 153 FERC ¶ 61,022 (May 8, 2015) (No. EL 15-64-000). 
173. Id. at 16. 
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response providers, or Special Case Resources (“SCR”), in the ICAP 
market.174 The mandatory measures provide that “unless exempt 
from [market] mitigation, new capacity resources must enter 
[mitigated capacity zone ICAP] markets . . . at a price at or above 
the . . . offer floor and continue to meet the offer floor until their 
capacity clears twelve month auctions.”175 Under the BSM rules, 
the NYISO must evaluate every resource in a mitigated zone to 
determine if it should receive an exemption from the capacity offer 
floor or cap measures.176 If an SCR is ineligible for an exemption, 
it is subject to mitigation and may be unable to earn capacity 
market revenues if the clearing price at auction is below the SCR’s 
minimum bid, or offer floor.177  
In May 2015, the New York PSC, the New York Power 
Authority (“NYPA”), and the New York State Energy Research and 
Development Authority (“NYSERDA”) (collectively, the “Parties”) 
filed a complaint against the NYISO arguing, inter alia, that the 
BSM rules should not apply to renewable energy resources, nuclear 
resources, SCRs, and demand response resources.178 In regards to 
demand response, the Parties advocated that including state-level 
demand programs into the SCR Offer Floor calculation would 
likely deter demand response from participating in utility demand 
response programs to avoid mitigation in capacity markets.179 The 
Parties asserted that the BSM rules would have the effect of 
“interfering with the State’s distribution-level [d]emand [r]esponse 
programs . . . [and] impermissibly intrud[ing] upon reliability and 
distribution planning matters reserved to the states under the 
Federal Power Act,” a similar argument advanced by the EPSA 
before the Supreme Court.180 Relatedly, Parties asserted that the 
BSM rules interfere with the State’s ability to use demand 
 
174. Morrison, supra note 55, at 14. 
175. Id. (citation omitted). 
176. Complaint, supra note 172, at 11. 
177. Id. at 18. 
178. N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n et al. v. N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, 153 
FERC ¶ 61,022 (Oct. 9, 2015) (No. EL 15-64-000). The Parties made additional 
arguments as to the application of the BSM measures that are not within the 
scope of this note’s discussion. The Parties were joined in November 2015 by the 
City of New York, Multiple Intervenors, and the Natural Resources Defense 
Council in seeking a rehearing of FERC’s BSM Exemption Order. 
179. Complaint, supra note 157, at 3. 
180. Id. 
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response as a system tool to lower retail rates.181 In effect, the 
Parties argued NYISO’s BSM rules constituted impermissible 
overreaching into state jurisdictional territory under the FPA by 
erecting barriers to entry into the state’s demand response 
programs.182   
By interfering in state-level demand response, the Parties 
argued that the NYISO interfered with legitimate state policy 
objectives that obligate the PSC to consider environmental policy 
when setting utility distribution rates and regulations.183 New 
York’s 2015 State Energy Plan instituted REV and outlined the 
state’s policy of “removing market barriers and bridging market 
gaps to transition New York to a clean energy economy that will 
produce economic growth and preserve the state’s environment by 
reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases and other 
pollutants.”184 Additionally, the Energy Plan instructed that 
mechanisms that reduce or shift peak demand, such as demand 
response, should be “seriously considered, whenever practical.”185  
In so inducing SCRs to choose between participating in retail, 
distribution-level demand response participation or NYISO-
administered demand response, the BSM rules effectively limited 
the state’s ability to achieve its environmental targets, particularly 
due to the fact that both wholesale and retail demand response are 
necessary to achieve wide-spread environmental benefits. 
Wholesale and retail demand response are “intended to address 
different systems, yield distinct benefits, and compensate for 
different services provided.”186 The Parties called out the 
cooperative federalism argument espoused by the Supreme Court, 
and in response to Parties’ complaint, the NYISO agreed. In its 
answer, the NYISO recognized the indirect effect BSM rules would 
have on demand response participation, erecting a barrier to entry 
in the market, and halting the state’s ability to meet its REV, and 
state energy policy goals.187  
 
181.  Id. 
182.  Id. 
183.  Id. at 37 (citing N.Y. ENERGY LAW § 3-0101(1) (2016)). 
184.  Id. at 38 (citation omitted). 
185.  Complaint, supra note 157, at 39. 
186.  Id. at 42. 
187.  Answer at 2, N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n et al. v. N.Y. Indep. Sys. 
Operator, 153 FERC ¶ 61,022 (No. EL 16-92-000) (Aug. 2016). 
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In effect, the Parties’ challenge of the NYISO’s market rules 
was a direct application of the EPSA decision. FERC, and the 
entities subject to its jurisdiction, may regulate the wholesale 
market but must not interfere in retail rate-setting. As opposed to 
Order 745’s demand response rules deemed legitimate by the 
Supreme Court, the NYISO’s BSM rules (wholesale capacity 
market rules) interfered with the state’s ability to set just and 
reasonable retail rates through the use of distribution-level (retail 
market) demand response, in contravention of the FPA and the 
Supreme Court’s EPSA holding. The arguments espoused by 
Parties represent the challenges states may face in implementing 
the Court’s ruling. This challenge presents a case study into states’ 
abilities to advocate for large-scale environmental benefits through 
the use of both wholesale and retail demand response.  
V. ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS OF DEMAND 
RESPONSE  
By shaping consumer preferences for energy resources and 
shifting consumption to lower-demand periods, demand response 
has great potential to lessen the environmental externality costs of 
generating electricity. While promoting more renewable energy 
resources and strategically shifting demand has been shown to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions at the local level, little is known 
of the full environmental benefits of demand response.188 Thus, an 
environmental regulatory scheme aimed at combating climate 
change should incorporate some form of demand response in both 
retail and wholesale energy markets. A brief analysis of demand 
response studies is necessary to understand the full beneficial 
potential of incorporating demand response into an environmental 
regulatory scheme.  
Demand response studies have revealed the energy 
conservation potential of strategic demand curtailment. When 
customers see the impact of demand response on their monthly 
electric bills, over time, they may adopt further conservation habits 
that, when combined with other demand-side energy-saving 
strategies, have quantifiable environmental benefits. However, 
“one of the most important yet inadequately investigated elements 
 
188.  See Nemtzow et al., supra note 13, at 43. 
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of [demand response] is its impact on the environment. There are 
numerous reasons to expect a positive environmental impact . . . 
but the results will always be very system- and generation-fleet 
specific.”189  
Perhaps the primary “environmental” characteristic of 
demand response is its ability to shape individual consumer 
behavior towards more energy efficient electricity consumption by 
animating wholesale and capacity market forces.190 The extent to 
which demand response can shape consumption is ultimately 
dependent on the energy resources used to produce the grid’s 
electricity supply (the generation fleet).191 For instance, 
implementing demand response in a grid system where gas 
generators supply baseload and diesel fuel generators supply peak 
load will produce different environmental impacts than demand 
response mechanisms in a grid mix containing coal baseload 
generators and hydro-electric peaking generators.192 Given the 
variety of energy fuels used to generate electricity across the 
United States, the environmental benefits accruing from demand 
response are dependent on what fuel sources are used, how close 
generation is located to the point of consumption, the consumption 
patterns of end users – including residential, commercial, and 
industrial consumers – and the regulatory reach of the entities who 
participate in and/or administer the demand response program.193 
While the environmental impacts associated with demand 
response are partially dependent on the energy fuel used to 
produce electricity, the converse is also true – demand response 
can encourage the use of particular energy fuels (i.e. natural gas, 
solar, wind, etc.) to generate electricity.194 Namely, demand 
response can encourage implementation of renewable energy 
resources into the grid’s mix of electricity.195 The very nature of 
demand response – cutting consumption to decrease demand on 
the system – facilitates the use of intermittent generation, for 
instance, sources such as wind and solar, that cannot be generated 
 
189.  Id. 
190.  Id. at 41. 
191.  Id. at 43. 
192.  Id. at 43. 
193.  See generally id. 
194.  Nemtzow et al., supra note 13, at 43. 
195.  See generally id. 
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when the wind is not blowing or when the sun is not shining.196 In 
addition to using demand response to cut consumption during peak 
demand periods, it can also be used to balance load as intermittent 
energy sources power up and come on line.197 Load balancing, the 
practice of storing power during low demand periods to meet 
increasing demand, may alleviate the intermittency downfalls of 
renewable energy resources, thereby making renewable energy a 
more viable, dependable supply of energy.198 In this way, and in 
combination with certain new technologies, demand response is an 
important support infrastructure for developing renewable energy 
resources.199 
The environmental benefits of demand response go much 
farther than simply shifting and cutting energy consumption. In 
fact, studies aimed at exploring the location-based environmental 
benefits of demand response suggest that demand response can 
mitigate the effects of climate change through the reduction of 
carbon, nitrous oxide, and sulfur dioxide emissions.200 Shifting 
generation from peak to off-peak periods also shifts emissions from 
energy generation and consumption to off-peak periods.201 Off-
peak periods include nighttime, when less electricity is needed in 
homes, businesses, and industrial processes, and spring and fall, 
when air conditioning and heating are not used to the extent they 
are needed in the summer and winter.202 Greenhouse gases like 
nitrous oxide, sulfur dioxide, and particulates can be altered and 
exacerbated by the presence of sunlight and high temperatures.203 
Mixed with sunlight, these greenhouse gas emissions form ground-
 
196. Id. at 44. 
197. Id. 
198. See Lauren Sommer, A (Load) Balancing Act: The Challenge of Clean 
Power, NPR (Aug. 18, 2010, 1:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story. 
php?storyId=129253742 [https://perma.cc/AN66-SPA6]. 
199. Nemtzow et al., supra note 13, at 45. 
200. See id. 
201. Id. at 44. 
202. Time of Use Hours & Pricing, PAC. POWER, https://www.pacificpower. 
net/ya/po/otou/ooh.html [https://perma.cc/XB4Y-FLL2]. 
203. Causes of Climate Change, EPA, http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ 
science/causes.html [https://perma.cc/54P5-2TR5]. Greenhouse gases released 
overnight are nevertheless affected by rising temperatures and sunlight the 
following day; however, by shifting daytime energy use to off-peak periods, less 
greenhouse gases are emitted during these high temperature/sunlight periods, 
mitigating some climate change effects. See generally id. 
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level ozone and smog.204 Thus, shifting electricity consumption to 
off-peak periods can reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 
alleviating the formation of ozone and smog.205 Because of demand 
responses’ potential to drastically mitigate greenhouse gas 
emissions in this way, the Ozone Transport Commission and state 
environmental agencies have begun to explore the use of demand 
response as a method for achieving ambient air quality standards 
in non-attainment areas regulated under the Clean Air Act.206 
Though the emissions-mitigation and renewable energy 
implementation benefits of demand response have wide-reaching 
impacts on global climate change, most environmental benefits 
from demand response occur at the local level.207 In a 2003 study 
modeling the impact of demand response on air emissions in New 
England, Synapse Energy Economics (“Synapse”) noted resulting 
regional emissions reductions.208 The study examined large, 
established demand response programs, and included models for 
distributed generation.209 Because demand response functions to 
shift electricity consumption to off-peak periods, the study found 
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions to be most significant in 
summer months.210 Synapse noted significant reductions in 
 
204. Nemtzow et al., supra note 13, at 44. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. Distributed generation is defined as “renewable energy sited at or 
close to where its energy is consumed.” THOMAS BOURGEOIS ET AL., PACE ENERGY 
& CLIMATE CTR., COMMUNITY MICROGRIDS: SMARTER, CLEANER, GREENER 3 (2013), 
http://energy.pace.edu/sites/default/files/publications/Community%20Microgrids
%20Report%20(2).pdf [https://perma.cc/LHP3-NP25]. Distributed generation can 
take the form of solar photovoltaics, solar thermal, wind, hydro, geothermal, or 
biomass, as well as combined heat and power technologies. Id. at 2. Distributed 
generation allows electricity to be produced closer to the source of consumption, 
thereby reducing line losses (energy lost as heat in the transmission process) and 
emissions from large-scale baseload generators. Distributed generation has been 
recognized as a clean energy resource with valuable implications for future energy 
markets. See ASHWANI KUMAR, ZONAL-BASED APPROACH FOR OPTIMAL LOCATION OF 
DISTRIBUTED GENERATION IN POOL-BASED DEREGULATED ELECTRICITY MARKETS 
AND POTENTIAL BENEFITS (2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1539296 [https://perma.cc/A2FL-9FS3]; THOMAS BOURGEOIS ET AL., 
supra note 209. 
210. Nemtzow et al., supra note 13, at 44. Reductions in greenhouse gases 
were most noticeable in the summer months because demand response shifted 
consumption to non-summer months. Id. Because less electricity was consumed 
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nitrous oxide, sulfur dioxide, and carbon dioxide attributable to 
demand response programs.211 In comparing the effect of demand 
response on diesel- versus gas-fired generation, however, Synapse 
noted only “small but significant impacts” on emissions.212 
Nevertheless, the study ultimately found large-scale demand 
response mechanisms significantly reduced most criteria pollutant 
emissions in the New England Region.213 While the results of the 
Synapse study could not be extrapolated beyond the New England 
region, the study nonetheless supports the theory underlying this 
note – that state-level demand response must coincide with a 
federal-oversight model in order to affect an environmental 
regulatory scheme.  
In January 2015, the Brattle Group, Inc. completed a study on 
behalf of EnerNOC analyzing the benefits of demand response.214 
The results included a generally smaller geographic footprint of the 
grid.215 Such findings were primarily the result of reduced 
generator total emissions, including reduced criteria and 
hazardous pollutants.216 The study advised that “these reductions 
would be particularly valuable in designated ‘non-attainment 
areas’ where pre-determined emissions levels cannot be 
exceeded.”217 To the extent that reductions in peak demand also 
avoided new generation, demand response could be credited with 
reduced impacts on wildlife habitats and sensitive ecosystems.218 
Additionally, if utilities incorporated time-varying retail rates to 
institute demand response, a strong rate aimed at skimming peak 
 
in the summer, less greenhouse gases were emitted in the generation of 
electricity, and thus, less emissions were present during prime ozone- and smog-
forming sunny months. Id. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. In this particular study, Synapse did not explore the emissions 
reductions associated with shifting consumption from gas- to renewable-powered 
generation resources. Id. 
213. Id. 
214. RYAN HLEDIK & AHMAD FARUQUI, VALUING DEMAND RESPONSE: 
INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICES, CASE STUDIES, AND APPLICATIONS 26-27 (2015), 
http://www.brattle.com/system/publications/pdfs/000/005/343/original/Valuing_D
emand_Response_-_International_Best_Practices__Case_Studies__and_ 
Applications.pdf?1468964700 [https://perma.cc/N29P-REQ7]. 
215. Id. at 27. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. 
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load could aid in the implementation of distributed energy 
resources.219 “For example, a strong time-of-use rate could improve 
the economics of rooftop solar by aligning the higher priced peak 
pricing period with the time of the highest output from the 
system.”220 Numerous other studies have supported these key 
findings.221  
VI. DESIGNING AN ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATORY SCHEME 
Wholesale and retail demand response mechanisms are not 
mutually exclusive. While the Federal Power Act creates distinct 
spheres of jurisdiction between wholesale and retail markets, the 
division of power between the state and federal government has 
not been so clear.222 Perhaps the decade-old struggle to draw 
jurisdictional lines has been settled by the Court’s embrace of 
cooperative federalism inherent in the FPA: “the [FPA] makes 
federal and state powers ‘complimentary’ and ‘comprehensive,’ so 
that there will be no ‘gaps’ for private interests to subvert the 
public welfare. Or said otherwise, the statute prevents the creation 
of any regulatory ‘no man’s land’.”223 States aiming to incorporate 
wholesale demand response alongside retail demand response 
programs in the aftermath of EPSA can look to the Supreme Court, 
California, and New York for examples of demand response in the 
context of environmental regulatory schemes.  
 
219. Id. 
220. HLEDIK & FARUQUI, supra note 214, at 29. 
221. See GREAT PLAINS INST., ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS OF DEMAND 
RESPONSE (2014), http://www.betterenergy.org/files/DR%20Fact%20Sheet%202% 
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see MONITORING ANALYTICS, THE 2017/2018 RPM BASE RESIDUAL AUCTION: 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSES (2014), http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/reports/ 
Reports/2014/IMM_20172018_RPM_BRA_Sensitivity_Analyses_20140710.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NLT4-W92K]; see JAMES MCANANY, 2014 DEMAND RESPONSE 
OPERATIONS MARKET ACTIVITY REPORT: OCTOBER 2014 (2014), http://www.pjm. 
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[https://perma.cc/6D5K-R3HS]. 
222. Joel B. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric 
Grid, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1783, 1788-89 (2016). 
223. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 779 (2016) (citations 
omitted). 
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A. Strengths and Weaknesses of Wholesale v. Retail 
Demand Response 
FERC’s broad authority could be used to implement wide-
ranging environmental and energy objectives.224 So long as the 
environmental and energy goals pursued by FERC have a direct or 
integral impact on wholesale markets, it cannot be said to be 
beyond its jurisdiction.225 This gives FERC broad discretion to 
incorporate environmentally sustainable objectives into wholesale 
level demand response programs, to trump less environmentally 
beneficial state law when there is a direct conflict, and even 
influence the retail market to the extent that retail activities 
impact wholesale electricity markets.226  
FERC could use its broad authority to incorporate a new 
positive value system into wholesale electricity markets.227 In 
determining the wholesale price of electricity resources, FERC can 
incorporate environmental and social externality values.228 In 
placing a carbon adder on the wholesale price of coal and natural 
gas,229 while offering renewable energy credits for solar, wind, and 
hydroelectric power, FERC can effectively charge unsustainable 
fossil fuel electricity generators for their emissions.230 
FERC’s authority to regulate the wholesale market must be 
exercised to fill the gaps where state jurisdiction ends. Federal 
initiatives that direct ISOs/RTOs to implement demand response 
programs that incentivize the use of renewable over nonrenewable 
energy resources (without hindering market entry into state-level 
demand response) have quantifiable widespread environmental 
benefits.231 
 
224. Eisen, supra note 222, at 1783. 
225. Id. at 1805. 
226. Id. at 1813. 
227. Id. at 1783. 
228. Id. at 1848. 
229. A carbon adder is an additional charge (usually a few cents per 
megawatt hour) added to the wholesale price of an energy commodity to 
internalize the externality cost of carbon emissions released from the combustion 
of that resource. Id. at 1788, 1834. 
230. See Eisen, supra note 222, at 1834. 
231. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, BENEFITS OF DEMAND RESPONSE IN ELECTRICITY 
MARKETS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACHIEVING THEM: A REPORT TO THE U.S. 
CONGRESS PURSUANT TO SECTION 1252 OF THE ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005 xv 
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Conversely, some scholars argue that FERC’s jurisdiction, 
while wide in scope, is not so wide as to transform the electric grid 
into a less environmentally intensive entity.232 The Department of 
Energy (DOE) has even cautioned policymakers in attributing 
environmental benefits to demand response.233 The DOE’s caveat 
only applies a marginal percent to global environmental benefits. 
Based on studies from the early 2000’s, the DOE determined that 
environmental gains from demand response are “dependent on the 
emissions profiles and marginal operating costs of the generation 
plants in specific regions.”234 Since 2006, however, the value of 
localized benefits stemming from demand response has been 
recognized.235 In its Report to Congress on the benefits of demand 
response in the electricity market, the DOE did not wholly throw 
out demand response as potentially environmentally beneficial. 
Rather, the DOE advised that in order to appropriately assess the 
possible environmental benefits of demand response, the amount 
of emissions reductions during peak demand – as a result of a 
curtailed response – must be weighed against increases in 
emissions during off-peak hours, as well as increased use of 
distributed generation.236 In balancing these considerations, 
localized environmental benefits have a larger marginal impact on 
the local grid system.237 Cumulatively, localized benefits may have 
a marginal effect on the larger grid system.238  
B. Reaping the Environmental Benefits of Demand 
Response   
Numerous market and policy mechanisms, when deployed 
under the right conditions, can achieve environmental benefits.239 
To optimize environmental objectives, the electricity market must 
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be transformed.240 Both wholesale and retail markets must employ 
demand response programs that strategically curtail demand to 
reduce environmental impacts through conservation. To effectively 
internalize the externality costs of unsustainable electricity 
generation, policy makers must institute a national environmental 
regulatory scheme that fosters localized benefits. The breadth of 
FERC’s jurisdiction over practices affecting the wholesale market 
gives it great discretion to equip states with the demand-side tools 
to sustainably manage energy consumption.241 Due to the 
concentrated nature of demand response benefits, end-use 
customers at the local level must have a market incentive to prefer 
renewable energy.242 FERC’s ability to regulate wholesale energy 
prices gives it leeway to institute those market incentives.243 When 
customers see increasing reductions in their monthly energy bills, 
they begin to form more sustainable consumption habits over 
time.244 Consumption patterns at the local level affect needed 
supply at the wholesale level.245 Thus, conscious consumers can 
shape national energy resource use, but to do so, they must see the 
true cost of that energy.  
 The federal regulatory model must comprise aspects of 
cooperative federalism, whereby state governments, state 
agencies, and FERC exercise non-conflicting jurisdiction. Both 
state and federal entities must retain their distinctive 
jurisdictional roles, but rather than being mutually exclusive, the 
presence of both powers must strengthen the overall regulatory 
scheme. A rule is stronger when enforced by both states and the 
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federal government than by one entity alone. States must inform 
federal environmental regulation in order to maximize local 
environmental benefits. In the areas where states cannot regulate, 
federal agencies must extend their jurisdiction in a way that 
promotes environmental sustainability. The federal regulatory 
model should aim to reduce the negative environmental impacts 
associated with energy production, generation, and consumption to 
the same, or even greater degree than the market would 
incidentally achieve as a result of scarcity-induced price increases 
and other spikes in demand.246 To determine how stringent 
regulation must be to achieve those results, the externality costs of 
the entire electric generating system must be quantified and 
internalized. Studies determining the social cost of carbon and 
tests for quantifying social values from various perspectives should 
be utilized in implementing policy mechanisms like 
“environmental standards, fuel and emission taxes, subsidies for 
renewable energy production, mandated diversified energy 
portfolios, and emission permit-trading schemes.”247 New York is 
doing this through the use of zero-emission credits (“ZECs”) and 
renewable energy credits (“RECs”) in emissions-trading schemes 
that use the social cost of carbon to set the price at which credits 
may be bought and sold. 
 FERC, in instituting Order 745, realized the inadequacy of 
demand response in the wholesale market and the threat to the 
system’s ability to meet peak demand. While FERC has broad 
discretion to regulate wholesale market rates, it has limited 
authority to consider environmental objectives directly when 
determining whether wholesale electricity rates are just and 
reasonable. Thus, in order to ensure system reliability, demand 
response must be rationalized by the effects environmental 
benefits will have on the electric system. For instance, instead of a 
carbon adder, the wholesale price of energy could contain a 
“reliability adder.”248 Adding this cost would place a direct value 
on the system benefit, focusing on the grid benefits of demand 
response in order to achieve environmental benefits.249 Such 
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market mechanisms would allow the wholesale price of electricity 
to more accurately be carried through to the customer, allowing the 
end user to form sustainable consumption patterns.250 
 Where FERC cannot directly regulate the energy sector with 
environmental sustainability in mind, state and local entities will 
play an important role. New York State has recognized the value 
of municipal involvement and customer engagement. In its REV 
proceeding, New York identified “mix[ed] traditional outreach 
methods . . . social media and community-based marketing 
approaches . . . [and] accommodating customer diversity in the 
design of demand side management programs” as best practices for 
customer education.251 The value derived from engaging the public 
can be attributed to input on “cultural and behavioral factors that 
affect energy use.”252 Knowledge of these local characteristics 
better informs policy makers of customer consumption, allowing 
for more productive incentives and technologies to achieve 
environmental benefits.253 
Retail-level demand response and state-level environmental 
regulation has even greater weight following FERC v. EPSA. In 
reversing the D.C. Circuit’s ruling, the Supreme Court has 
effectively prevented the future of distributed generation and 
behind-the-meter technologies from falling exclusively into the 
regulatory hands of the states.254 While this does not altogether 
sound like cause for environmentalist celebration, vacating Order 
745 would have ultimately stripped FERC of the ability to regulate 
rooftop solar, on-site electricity storage, and other demand-side 
technologies.255 If FERC was prohibited from factoring these 
demand-shaping entities into the wholesale price of energy, energy 
efficiency and demand management technologies would not be 
competitive with less expensive, but more environmentally 
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damaging energy resources.256 Optimal environmental regulation 
in the aftermath of FERC v. EPSA, must thus strike a balance 
between state and federal authority that anticipates the 
jurisdictional gaps created by judicial and legislative decisions. For 
instance, states may be better suited to directly incorporate 
environmentally-geared demand response programs, incentives for 
renewable and distributed generation, and customer-tailored 
energy-saving technologies. Conversely, FERC is better suited to 
implement demand response that will indirectly accrue 
environmental benefits by shaping wholesale and capacity market 
forces, as reflected in decreased retail rates.  
The environmentalist’s ideal regulatory scheme must draw on 
the strengths and weaknesses of the division of power between the 
state and federal government to maximize benefits. The 
infeasibility of demand planning at the state level provides an 
opportunity for FERC oversight.257 The impracticality of 
conducting supply-only planning at the federal level necessitates 
the need for cooperative federalism.258 A system designed to the 
contrary would hardly be affordable nor effective at achieving 
environmental sustainability.259 Despite decades of jurisdictional 
confusion over where the realm of state power ends and federal 
oversight begins, the solution to an environmentally-conscious 
energy regulatory scheme must strike a balance between these two 
spheres of influence.  
VII. CONCLUSION  
The era of cooperative federalism in demand response is just 
beginning. While the Supreme Court has granted FERC authority 
to regulate wholesale demand response affecting retail markets, 
states have additional power to determine what retail entities may 
administer demand response, if at all. In the aftermath of FERC v. 
EPSA, FERC will undoubtedly face the growing number of state-
level programs that are popping up alongside, and sometimes 
overlapping with, wholesale level demand response programs. 
States will continue to fill the gaps by expanding on the already 
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increasing number of retail-level demand response programs. 
Thus, with both state and federal governments retaining 
jurisdiction over some aspect of demand response, the most 
environmentally-sound regulatory schemes will take advantage of 
this rare opportunity to enforce energy conservation at both the 
state and federal levels. In the coming decade, bottom-up and top-
down reforms are necessary to realize dual environmentalism: the 
most responsible mechanism to manage energy consumption and 
its associated environmental impacts for the future. 
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